From d0445d71e88feb2b6e358195d864a6a1ddfebd1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tobias Powalowski Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 09:09:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] remove patch --- CVE-2012-0056.patch | 268 -------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 268 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 CVE-2012-0056.patch diff --git a/CVE-2012-0056.patch b/CVE-2012-0056.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a83fef..0000000 --- a/CVE-2012-0056.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,268 +0,0 @@ -From e268337dfe26dfc7efd422a804dbb27977a3cccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Linus Torvalds -Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 15:21:19 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH] proc: clean up and fix /proc//mem handling -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc//mem handling really isn't very -robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the -other related files. - -This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of -tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open. That -simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file -descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_ -VM. - -That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler. If -somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert -this commit. - -I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping -addresses will also have changed as part of the execve. So you cannot -actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all -the offsets for IO would have changed too. - -Reported-by: Jüri Aedla -Cc: Al Viro -Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds ---- - fs/proc/base.c | 145 +++++++++++++++----------------------------------------- - 1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c -index 5485a53..662ddf2 100644 ---- a/fs/proc/base.c -+++ b/fs/proc/base.c -@@ -198,65 +198,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) - return result; - } - --static struct mm_struct *__check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task) --{ -- struct mm_struct *mm; -- -- mm = get_task_mm(task); -- if (!mm) -- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); -- -- /* -- * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses -- * to use system calls instead of load instructions. -- */ -- if (task == current) -- return mm; -- -- /* -- * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be -- * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it. -- */ -- if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) { -- int match; -- rcu_read_lock(); -- match = (ptrace_parent(task) == current); -- rcu_read_unlock(); -- if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) -- return mm; -- } -- -- /* -- * No one else is allowed. -- */ -- mmput(mm); -- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); --} -- --/* -- * If current may access user memory in @task return a reference to the -- * corresponding mm, otherwise ERR_PTR. -- */ --static struct mm_struct *check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task) --{ -- struct mm_struct *mm; -- int err; -- -- /* -- * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate -- * against old credentials. -- */ -- err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); -- if (err) -- return ERR_PTR(err); -- -- mm = __check_mem_permission(task); -- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); -- -- return mm; --} -- --struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task) -+static struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) - { - struct mm_struct *mm; - int err; -@@ -267,7 +209,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task) - - mm = get_task_mm(task); - if (mm && mm != current->mm && -- !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { -+ !ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) { - mmput(mm); - mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); - } -@@ -276,6 +218,11 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task) - return mm; - } - -+struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task) -+{ -+ return mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); -+} -+ - static int proc_pid_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) - { - int res = 0; -@@ -752,38 +699,39 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = { - - static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file) - { -- file->private_data = (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id); -+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode); -+ struct mm_struct *mm; -+ -+ if (!task) -+ return -ESRCH; -+ -+ mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); -+ put_task_struct(task); -+ -+ if (IS_ERR(mm)) -+ return PTR_ERR(mm); -+ - /* OK to pass negative loff_t, we can catch out-of-range */ - file->f_mode |= FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET; -+ file->private_data = mm; -+ - return 0; - } - - static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) - { -- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode); -+ int ret; - char *page; - unsigned long src = *ppos; -- int ret = -ESRCH; -- struct mm_struct *mm; -+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data; - -- if (!task) -- goto out_no_task; -+ if (!mm) -+ return 0; - -- ret = -ENOMEM; - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY); - if (!page) -- goto out; -- -- mm = check_mem_permission(task); -- ret = PTR_ERR(mm); -- if (IS_ERR(mm)) -- goto out_free; -- -- ret = -EIO; -- -- if (file->private_data != (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id)) -- goto out_put; -+ return -ENOMEM; - - ret = 0; - -@@ -810,13 +758,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, - } - *ppos = src; - --out_put: -- mmput(mm); --out_free: - free_page((unsigned long) page); --out: -- put_task_struct(task); --out_no_task: - return ret; - } - -@@ -825,27 +767,15 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf, - { - int copied; - char *page; -- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode); - unsigned long dst = *ppos; -- struct mm_struct *mm; -+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data; - -- copied = -ESRCH; -- if (!task) -- goto out_no_task; -+ if (!mm) -+ return 0; - -- copied = -ENOMEM; - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY); - if (!page) -- goto out_task; -- -- mm = check_mem_permission(task); -- copied = PTR_ERR(mm); -- if (IS_ERR(mm)) -- goto out_free; -- -- copied = -EIO; -- if (file->private_data != (void *)((long)current->self_exec_id)) -- goto out_mm; -+ return -ENOMEM; - - copied = 0; - while (count > 0) { -@@ -869,13 +799,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf, - } - *ppos = dst; - --out_mm: -- mmput(mm); --out_free: - free_page((unsigned long) page); --out_task: -- put_task_struct(task); --out_no_task: - return copied; - } - -@@ -895,11 +819,20 @@ loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig) - return file->f_pos; - } - -+static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -+{ -+ struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data; -+ -+ mmput(mm); -+ return 0; -+} -+ - static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = { - .llseek = mem_lseek, - .read = mem_read, - .write = mem_write, - .open = mem_open, -+ .release = mem_release, - }; - - static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, --- -1.7.6.5 -